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Abstract 
This paper describes initial work towards building an explicit 
assurance case for DO-178C / ED-12C.  Two specific 
questions are explored: (1) What are some of the assumptions 
upon which the guidance in the document relies, and (2) What 
claims are made concerning test coverage analysis?   
1 Introduction 
For about two decades, compliance with Software 
Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification (DO-178B / ED-12B) [7] has been the primary 
means for receiving regulatory approval for using software on 
commercial airplanes.  Despite frequent and occasionally 
strident criticisms of the standard from various quarters, the 
empirical evidence is quite strong that it has been successful.  
Not only has no fatal commercial aircraft accident been 
attributed to a software error, many of the technological 
improvements that have been credited with significantly 
reducing the accident rate have relied heavily on software.  
For example, controlled flight into terrain—once one of the 
most common accident categories—has been nearly 
eliminated by Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems, 
which are software-intensive [15]. 
 
The next edition of the standard, DO-178C / ED-12C, has 
been published by the issuing bodies [8].  New editions of 
two associated documents have also been published: Software 
Integrity Assurance Considerations for Communication, 
Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Management 
(CNS/ATM) Systems (DO-278A / ED-109A) [10], and 
Supporting Information (DO-248C / ED-94C) [9].  
Additionally four new guidance documents have been 
published to address software tool qualification 
considerations (DO-330 / ED-215) [11], model-based 
development and verification (DO-331 / ED-216) [12], 
object-oriented technology (DO-332 / ED-217) [13], and 
formal methods (DO-333 / ED-218) [14].  These standards 
have not yet received official regulatory authority approval, 
but the granting of approval is expected in due course. 
 
The stated purpose of DO-178C / ED-12C remains essentially 
unchanged: providing guidance ―for the production of 
software for airborne systems and equipment that performs its 
intended function with a level of confidence in safety that 
complies with airworthiness requirements.‖  In DO-178B / 
ED-12B little or no rationale is given for how a particular 
objective or collection of objectives contributes to achieving 
this purpose.  Thus, the assurance case for the document is 
implicit.  Empirical evidence suggests that this implicit 
assurance case is adequate, but its implicitness makes 
analysing why it is adequate quite difficult. DO-178C / ED-
12C is also mostly rationale-free, but the revised edition of 
DO-248C / ED-94C includes a new section: ‗Rationale for 
DO-178C [ED-12C] / DO-278A [ED-94C]‘.  This rationale 
section provides a basis from which building an explicit 
assurance case may be feasible.  
 
This paper describes preliminary work towards building such 
an explicit assurance case for DO-178C / ED-12C.  Two 
specific questions are explored: (1) What are some of the 
assumptions upon which the guidance in the document relies, 
and (2) What claims are made concerning test coverage 
analysis?    
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 
provides brief background material about the DO-178C / ED-
12C document and the assurance case concept.  Section 3 
explores question (1). Section 4 discusses some initial 
possible answers to question (2).  Section 5 explains potential 
future work and presents concluding remarks. 
2 Background 
The primary intended audience of this paper is people who 
are at least passingly familiar with both DO-178B / ED-12B 
and the assurance case concept.  This section provides 
background information for readers who fall outside of this 
primary audience.   
2.1 About DO-178C / ED-12C 
Appendix A in DO-178C / ED-12C [8] contains a summary 
of the history of the DO-178 / ED-12 series of documents.  
The information below is derived from, and all quotations are 
taken from, this appendix. 
 
The initial document in the series was published in 1982, with 
revision A following only three years later in 1985. Work on 
revision B began in the fall of 1989; the completed document, 
which was a complete rewrite of the guidance, was published 
in December 1992.  This version introduced the notion of five 
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different possible software levels, with Level A denoting the 
highest level (on which the most rigorous objectives were 
levelled), and Level E denoting the lowest level (on which no 
objectives were levelled).  
 
Twelve years after the adoption of DO-178B / ED-12B, 
RTCA and EUROCAE moved to update it, when they 
approved the creation of a joint special committee / working 
group in December 2004 (SC-205/WG-71).   
 
This group began meeting in March 2005, and completed its 
work in November 2011.  It operated under directions that 
called for (among other things) maintaining an ―objective-
based approach for software assurance‖ and the ―technology 
independent nature‖ of the objectives.  The special 
committee/working group was also directed to seek to 
maintain ―backward compatibility with DO-178B / ED-12B‖ 
except where doing so would fail to ―adequately address the 
current states of the art and practice in software development 
in support of system safety‖, ―to address emerging trends‖, or 
―to allow change with technology.‖ The documents produced 
by the efforts are listed above.  
 
As a result of the terms of reference and operating 
instructions, DO-178C / ED-12C can be best thought of as an 
update to, as opposed to a re-write or substantial revision of, 
DO-178B / ED-12B.  Differences between the documents 
include simple corrections of known errors and 
inconsistencies, changes in wording intended for clarification 
and consistency, an added emphasis on the importance of the 
full body of the document, a change in tool qualification 
criteria and the related creation of a separate document for 
tool qualification, modification of the discussion of system 
aspects related to software development, closing of some 
perceived gaps in guidance, and the creation of technology-
specific supplements for formal methods, object-oriented 
technology, and model-based design and verification. 
2.2 About the assurance case concept 
The basic concept of an assurance case is simple
1
: provide a 
structured argument supported by evidence explaining why a 
particular claim about a system property is true. The most 
common instantiation of the concept involves claims about 
the system property of safety; hence the specific term safety 
case is perhaps more widely known than the more generic 
term. 
 
Claims, arguments, and evidence constitute the three 
necessary components of an assurance case. Each of these 
components must be stated explicitly and clearly in order to 
produce a cogent assurance case. A critical aspect of an 
explicit and clear statement is articulating the context within 
                                                          
1
 Although the concept is simple, much active research is on-
going about how to best create, express, analyse, improve, 
and maintain assurance cases (for example, [1], [2], [4], [5], 
[19]). 
 
and assumptions upon which the claims, arguments, and 
evidence depend.   
 
Some existing approaches and notations for expressing 
assurance cases distinguish between context and assumptions 
[3].  For the purposes of this paper, we consider such a 
distinction to be unnecessary. Both refer to information that is 
not directly part of the explicit claims, arguments, or 
evidence, but without which the claims, arguments, and 
evidence cannot be understood fully or evaluated properly.  
 
As a simple example of the importance of context and 
assumptions, consider the following claim: Improved helmet 
design will reduce the severity of concussions in football.  
Someone reading this claim in Edinburgh, Scotland, UK, is 
likely to find it unintelligible.  ―Helmets in football?  There 
are no helmets in football!‖ In contrast, someone reading the 
same claim in Edinburgh, Indiana, USA, is likely to find it 
easy to understand. They will assume that the claim is to be 
interpreted within the context of American football, in which 
helmets are a required piece of equipment (aka kit). 
 
Because of the importance of explicitly enumerating 
assumptions, one of the first activities that must be 
undertaken in trying to articulate the assurance case implicitly 
contained in DO-178C / ED-12C is to understand the context 
within and assumptions upon which the guidance rests.  
Initials steps towards this articulation are described in the 
next section.  
3 Foundational assumptions 
The work towards identifying all the relevant context and 
assumptions for the guidance has just begun.  Thus far, four 
important categories have been discovered: the goal of 
satisfying airworthiness requirements; an implied relationship 
between safety and correctness; permission of process 
flexibility; and reliance on standard software engineering 
practices. 
3.1 Satisfying airworthiness requirements 
As noted in the introduction, the stated purpose of DO-178C / 
ED-12C is to ―provide guidance for the production of 
software for airborne systems and equipment that performs its 
intended function with a level of confidence in safety that 
complies with airworthiness requirements‖ [8, p. 1]  The 
document itself does not provide any additional details about 
what constitutes the airworthiness requirements. Users of the 
document are expected to know the specific requirements that 
apply to the system they are developing. These requirements 
must be included as a critical part of the context of any 
assurance case. 
3.2 Relationship between safety and correctness 
Section 2 of DO-178C / ED-12C and Section 5.2 of the 
Rationale make clear that the guidance is based on the 
assumption that adequate system safety processes have been 
followed in determining the requirements placed on the 
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software and its criticality level.  For example, the Rationale 
states that ―Software/assurance levels and allocated system 
requirements are a result of the system development and 
safety assessment processes‖  [9, p. 126]   
 
These sections also make clear that all relevant safety-specific 
requirements are expected to be included. That is, one of the 
inputs that must be available before the guidance is applied is 
a comprehensive set of the requirements, including all of the 
requirements that must be satisfied to ensure an adequate 
level of safety is maintained. DO-178C / ED-12C is not 
concerned with determining or analysing these safety 
requirements, but only in satisfying them.  Hence, it is strictly 
true, as is often asserted, that the standard is not a safety 
standard [6].  Conducting system safety analysis is 
intentionally outside of the scope of the guidance.  Guidance 
for it is expected from other documents (for example [16], 
[17]). 
 
A reader may thus ask how safety can be legitimately 
mentioned as an important part of the purpose of the 
guidance. The answer to this question is based on the 
following reasoning, which is not explicitly stated, but 
definitely implied.   Given a set of requirements that includes 
everything necessary to provide an adequate level of safety, 
then ensuring that the requirements are met necessarily 
ensures that the adequate level of safety is provided.  So, the 
guidance needs to be concerned only with ensuring that 
software satisfies its requirements.  Within the context to 
which the guidance applies, software system correctness 
necessarily implies software system safety.  This implication 
does not hold in the general case, but it does hold in this 
specific case. Thus, the DO-178C / ED-12C assurance case 
can concentrate on demonstrating correctness of 
implementation. 
3.3 Permission of process flexibility 
Another foundational assumption of DO-178C / ED-12C may 
come as a surprise to people whose only exposure to the 
guidance and its ancestors comes through criticisms by 
academics:  developers are permitted wide process flexibility.  
As stated in the Rationale,  ―The committee wanted to avoid 
prescribing any specific development methodology.  [The 
guidance] allows for a software life cycle to be defined with 
any suitable life cycle model(s) to be chosen for software 
development. This is further supported by the introduction of 
‗transition criteria‘.  Specific transition criteria between one 
process and the next are not prescribed, rather [the guidance] 
states that transition criteria should be defined and adhered to 
throughout the development life cycle(s) selected‖ [9, p. 126]. 
 
The DO-178C / ED-12C guidance does include detailed 
descriptions of specific activities that may be performed in 
order to satisfy particular objectives. However, the guidance 
also explicitly states that the activities themselves may be 
changed: ―The applicant should plan a set of activities that 
satisfy the objectives.  This document describes activities for 
achieving those objectives.  The applicant may plan and, 
subject to approval of the certification authority, adopt 
alternative activities to those described in this document. The 
applicant may also plan and conduct additional activities that 
are determined to be necessary‖ [8, p. 3]. 
 
This flexibility must be considered in the creation of an 
assurance case.   It means that certain parts of the argument 
should permit alternate instantiations.  An instantiation based 
on the activities described in the guidance can be developed, 
but it should be made clear that this is only an example, and 
that other instantiations may be possible. 
3.4 Reliance on standard software engineering practices 
The fourth foundational assumption of DO-178C / ED-12C 
that has been uncovered thus far is that it relies in substantial 
part on the efficacy of standard software engineering 
practices.  The overview section of the Rationale identifies 
this reliance clearly: ―Since DO-178C / DO-278A heavily 
borrows from standard software engineering principles that 
are well understood, rationale is only provided for those 
elements within the document that are specific to aircraft 
certification (or CNS/ATM system approval).  The reader is 
directed to the public literature for rationale for items not 
covered in this section‖ [9, p. 125]. 
 
In creating an assurance case, a decision must be made about 
how to handle those parts of the guidance for which the 
rationale lies in standard practice.  One option is to terminate 
the analysis of such parts with a reference to practice.  
Another option is to continue the analysis by including 
claims, arguments, and evidence provided in the ‗public 
literature‘ mentioned in the Rationale (such as [6] [18]).  
4 Test Coverage Analysis 
Besides exploring the assumptions underlying the DO-178B / 
ED-12C guidance, the other preliminary work that has been 
conducted thus far is considering a specific aspect of the 
guidance, namely test coverage analysis.  This area was 
chosen because test coverage has been among the most 
frequently criticised aspects of DO-178B / ED-12B, and is 
likely to continue to be so for the updated guidance.   
 
The particular question that guided the initial work was, 
―What claims are made concerning test coverage analysis?‖ A 
careful articulation of the actual claims concerning test 
coverage should help clarify whether the criticisms are valid, 
or simply based on misunderstandings.  Valid criticisms will 
definitely affect the assurance case that is eventually 
produced, by identifying parts of the case in which confidence 
should not be placed.  The potential effect on the assurance 
case of existing misunderstandings is less clear-cut. 
 
Guidance for testing is provided in Section 6.4 [8, pp. 44-51], 
with test coverage analysis guidance given in Section 6.4.4 [8, 
pp. 49-51]. Testing objectives are summarised in Table A-6 
[8, p. 101]; test coverage objectives are summarised in Table 
A-7 [8, p. 102].  Supporting Information [9] contains a 
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discussion in the Rationale section [9, p. 129-130] and several 
frequently asked questions and discussion papers related to 
test coverage:  
 
 FAQ #42 What needs to be considered when performing 
structural coverage at the object code level? [9, p. 22] 
 FAQ #43 What is the intent of structural coverage 
analysis [9, pp. 23 – 24] 
 FAQ #44 Why is structural testing not a DO-178C / DO-
278A requirement? [9, p. 24] 
 FAQ #74 What is the difference between the 
development and life cycle objectives stated in DO-178C 
for Level A versus Level B software, and how does that 
relate to safety? [9, pp. 38-39] 
 DP #8 Structural Coverage and Safety Objectives [9, pp. 
70 – 71]. 
 DP #13 Discussion of Statement Coverage, Decision 
Coverage, and Modified Condition/Decision Coverage 
(MC/DC) [9, pp. 81- 88]. 
 
The guidance and supporting information distinguishes 
between the purposes of testing and the purposes of test 
coverage analysis.  Testing is intended ―to demonstrate that 
the software satisfies its requirements and demonstrate that 
errors that could lead to unacceptable failure conditions, as 
determined by the system safety assessment process, have 
been removed‖ [8, p. 44].  The objectives associated with 
testing involve the relationship between executable object 
code and its requirements, along with the compatibility of the 
executable object code with the target computer.  Testing is 
all about the software product itself. 
 
Test coverage analysis, on the other hand, has different 
purposes.  Two types of coverage analysis are described in 
the guidance: requirements-based test coverage analysis, and 
structural coverage analysis.  The purpose of the former is 
simply to analyse the test cases that were used in the 
requirements-based testing to confirm that they satisfy the 
criteria of the guidance.  The purpose of the latter is a bit less 
well understood.  Hence the abundance of popular criticism of 
the structural coverage criteria, and the amount of space 
devoted to it in Supporting Information.  Determining the 
structural coverage claims that should be included in an 
assurance case is difficult.  The discussion in the rest of this 
section is only a beginning towards that determination. 
 
Concerning structural coverage analysis, the guidance states 
that it ―determines which code structure, including interfaces 
between components, was not exercised by the requirements-
based test procedures.  The requirements-based test cases may 
not have completely exercised the code structure, including 
interfaces, so structural coverage analysis is performed and 
additional verification produced to provide structural 
coverage‖ [8, p. 49].   
 
It is important to recognize that structural coverage analysis is 
not presented in the guidance as a form of testing.  It is 
presented as a means of determining whether the 
requirements-based tests covered the code to the extent 
required by the software level.  If the analysis shows that 
adequate coverage has been achieved, no additional tests are 
required
2
. 
 
Evaluating the thoroughness of requirements-based testing is 
the purpose explicitly mentioned in the guidance. FAQ #43 
mentions two additional purposes: providing ―evidence that 
the code structure was verified to the degree required for the 
applicable software level‖, and providing ―a means to support 
demonstration of absence of unintended functions.‖  
 
Concerning the first of these additional purposes, the 
guidance requires demonstrating increasingly higher degrees 
of coverage for higher software level.  Level D does not 
require any structural coverage analysis.  Level C requires 
achieving statement coverage (every statement in the program 
is invoked at least once).  Level B requires decision coverage 
(every entry and exit point to the program is invoked at least 
once and every decision in the program has taken on all 
possible outcomes at least once).  For Level A software, 
achieving modified condition / decision coverage (MC/DC) is 
required (decision coverage with the additional requirement 
that ―each condition in a decision has been shown to 
independently affect a decision‘s outcome‖ [8, p. 114]).   
 
Intuitively, the notion of basing the thoroughness of coverage 
requirements on the criticality of the software makes sense. 
Executing more code structure should justify higher 
confidence that errors have not been missed than executing 
less.  For the Level C and B requirements, the Rationale 
section [9, p. 130] provides little additional insight beyond 
this intuitive notion.  For the Level C requirement it simply 
states that statement coverage was ―deemed satisfactory‖, and 
for Level B it says that decision coverage ―was considered 
sufficient to address the increase in the associated hazard 
category.‖ 
 
The Rationale‘s discussion about the reasons behind the 
MC/DC requirement does provide insight.  MC/DC was 
introduced in DO-178B / ED-12B.   Its introduction is 
identified as a compromise ―based on experience gained from 
three aircraft programs, where an approach derived from 
hardware logic testing that concentrated on showing that each 
term in a Boolean expression can be shown to affect the 
result, was applied to software.‖ This compromise was 
between the committee‘s desire that for level A software all 
logic expressions should be fully explored, and the 
recognition that ―the use of techniques such as multiple 
condition decision coverage, or exhaustive truth table 
evaluation to fully explore all of the logic was … 
impractical.‖ 
 
                                                          
2
 If someone says, for example, ―You have to do MC/DC 
testing on Level A software,‖ they are either using the 
language very loosely, or they do not know what they are 
talking about (or perhaps both). Anyone doubting the truth of 
this statement should consult FAQ #44 [9, p. 24]. 
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Concerning demonstrating unintended function, structural 
coverage analysis serves to help close a gap that might be left 
by requirements-based testing.  As FAQ #43 states, ―Code 
that is implemented without being linked to requirements may 
not be exercised by requirements-based tests. Such code 
could result in unintended functionality‖ [9, p. 23]. Because 
unintended functions could conceivably have a negative 
impact on system safety, detecting and eliminating them 
increases in importance with higher software levels.  
Structural coverage analysis is intended as a means to 
increase confidence that the code that really exists in the 
software has been reached, and thus any unintended 
functionality has been exposed. 
 
As noted at the beginning of this section, the motivating 
question for the initial exploration was ―What claims are 
made concerning test coverage analysis?‖  Claims identified 
thus far include the following: 
 
 Requirements-based test coverage analysis confirms that 
the requirement-based tests satisfy the criteria of the 
guidance. 
 Structural coverage analysis confirms whether the 
requirements-based tests covered the code to the extent 
required by the software level. 
 Structural coverage analysis identifies unintended 
functions that exist in the software. 
 
Refinements and additions to these claims are likely to be 
made as the effort continues. 
5 Future Work 
This paper has described preliminary work towards building 
an explicit assurance case for DO-178C / ED-12C. The next 
steps to be followed include receiving feedback from readers 
of the paper; articulating the top-level claim of the assurance 
case; completing the determination of the assumptions 
underlying this claim, and deciding how to handle each of 
these assumptions in the assurance case; deciding what 
notation(s) to use; completing the test coverage analysis 
work; and determining whether to take a breadth-first or 
depth-first approach to discovering sub-claims, arguments, 
and evidence.  
 
Once these steps are taken, the creation of a full assurance 
case can commence.  Readers interested in collaborating in 
the endeavour are encouraged to contact the author.   
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